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Abstract
In network industries, a Universal Service Obligation (USO) is often seen as a burden 
on an incumbent, which requires compensation for the net cost of such service 
provision. This paper estimates the effects of consumer loyalty as an intangible 
benefit of USO in the postal sector. In doing so, the agent-based modelling (ABM) 
approach is applied, which makes it possible to model the behaviour of boundedly 
rational consumers and is thus particularly appropriate for taking into account 
intangibles considerations. The analysis shows that loyalty is crucial to whether 
the USO uniform pricing constraint results in loss-making or profitability. Under 
certain conditions and in the presence of a loyalty parameter, uniform pricing gives 
a USO provider an advantage, when the size of the rural area is sufficiently big 
and a disadvantage, if its size is too small. This finding is counterintuitive as USO 
providers in countries with sparsely populated areas are typically expected to incur 
a significant net cost of USO.
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Résumé
L’obligation de service universel (USO) est souvent perçu par les industries de réseau 
comme un charge sur le fournisseur historique ce qui nécessite une compensation 
pour le coût net d’un tel fourniture de service. Cet article évalue les effets de la 
fidélité des consommateurs comme un avantage intangible de l’USO dans le secteur 
postal. Par cela, la modélisation multi-agents (GPA) est appliquée, ce qui permet de 
modéliser le comportement des consommateurs à rationalité limitée et qui est donc 
particulièrement approprié pour la prise en compte des considérations intangibles. 
L’analyse montre que la fidélité est essentielle pour savoir si la contrainte de prix 
uniforme de l’USO aboutit à la perte de décision ou de rentabilité. Sous certaines 
conditions et en présence d’un paramètre de fidélité, la tarification uniforme donne 
à un fournisseur de l’USO un avantage, lorsque la taille de la zone rurale est 
suffisament grande et un inconvénient, lorsque sa taille est trop petite. Ce résultat 
est contre-intuitif, car on attend généralement que les fournisseurs de l’USO dans 
les pays ayant des zones peu peuplées encourent un coût net important de l’USO.
Classifications and key words: agent-based modelling; liberalisation of the postal 
markets; postal sector; Universal Service Obligation (USO); USO provider.
I. Introduction 
A Universal Service Obligation (hereafter, USO) is often seen as a burden 
on an incumbent, which requires compensation for the net cost of such service 
provision. The question of the net cost of USO is relevant to all network 
industries, but the debate is at its most heated when discussing the postal 
sector. This is because the provision of postal services in sparsely populated 
areas – often combined with high delivery frequency – is typically seen as 
a significant cost for the operator as opposed to its overall revenues. The 
gradual phasing out of letter weight-based reserved areas was motivated by 
the perceived net cost of USO. Such monopoly rents were seen as a necessary, 
albeit implicit, form of subsidy for the cost of USO. With the liberalisation of 
the postal markets, this mechanism was replaced by a right for USO providers 
to (e)mail an invoice for the net cost of this service to the relevant regulator, 
seeking its review and, eventually, due compensation1. The significance of 
USO costs in the sector is lately exacerbated by decline in postal demand, 
largely due to the increasing use of electronic communication.
1 See specifically art. 7 and Annex I of Directive 2008/6/EC (3rd Postal Directive). These 
solutions bear strong resemblance to corresponding sections in Directive 97/33/EC and 2002/22/
EC in the electronic communications sector. 
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Academic literature has traditionally focused on the issue of cost allocation 
between USO and the remaining ‘commercial’ services of a USO provider2, 
placing lesser emphasis on the calculation of the benefits of USO to the 
incumbent3. Barkatullah (2002) et al and London Economics (2002) speak of 
demand complementarities (between USO and non-USO or even non-postal 
products) as a benefit of USO. In the same study, London Economics (2002) 
analyses economies of scale and scope for a multiproduct USO provider. In 
order to account for the benefits of USO on the supply side, another approach 
associates a monetary value with intangible assets such as: the commercial 
value of advertising space on postal outlets and fleets (Postcomm, 2001); 
contingent valuation/surveying of the value of a USO provider’s brand; 
corporate reputation in general (Burns et al, 2002). 
The uniform pricing requirement – often an explicit component of USO – is 
rarely discussed in the context of USO benefits. Instead, it is seen as a burden 
imposed on the incumbent that facilitates selective entry (‘cherry-picking’) by 
new operators. ‘Menu costs’, and the related lowering of transaction costs, 
are the only mechanism through which uniform pricing has been considered 
as a USO benefit so far (London Economics, 2002). 
In this paper, uniform pricing plays a role in terms of loyalty and for that 
reason can also be also hypothesised as an intangible benefit of USO. The 
analysis will commence with the presentation of the reasons for choosing the 
agent-based modelling approach for this analysis followed by an overview of 
its specification. The paper will continue on to present its main results and 
conclude, in the last section, with regulatory implications and suggestions for 
future research.
II. Choice of methodology
Agent-based modelling (herefater, ABM) is a relatively new approach to 
the simulation of complex systems. Agent-based modelling has a unique and 
very useful feature – instead of investigating the dynamics of an entire system, 
it assumes the perspective of its individual agents. It then studies the results 
2 See, for instance: M. Cigno, D. Monaco, E. Pearsall, An Operational Measure of the Cost 
of Universal Service as a Cross-subsidy, in Heightening Competition in the Postal and Delivery 
Sector, 2010 or Ch. Jagg, M. Koller, U. Trinker, Calculating the Cost of the Universal Service 
Obligation: the Need for a Global Approach, in Progress in the Competitive Agenda in the Postal 
and Delivery Sector, 2009. 
3 Strictly speaking, USO does not have to be vested with the incumbent but so far postal USO 
has never been offered to a new entrant or even put up for a tender in any EU member state. 
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of their interactions that often cannot be analytically inferred from individual 
behavioural rules4. The starting point of an ABM simulation is defined as: 
the agents and theory of their behaviour; the rules governing the relationships 
and interactions between agents and; agent-related parameters (Macal and 
North, 2005). 
When applied to social sciences, agents usually represent people or groups 
of people (e.g. firms or regulatory bodies). Formally, agents are described 
by means of their attributes which include: personal characteristics, location, 
or preferences and behaviours (i.e. decision-making algorithms). Among the 
advantages of ABM lies the fact that agents do not need to be defined as 
rational or to possess ‘representative’ characteristics, as is the case in traditional 
equilibrium-based modelling approaches. Agent-based modelling simulations 
are characterised by their flexibility because attributes and behaviours may vary 
across agents within the same model, as well as change during the simulation 
as a result of a ‘learning process’. 
Recent advances in computer science made ABM a powerful tool for 
simulations and forecasts, with direct applications in network industries5. 
Telecommunications and postal markets are promising fields for the use of 
ABM given, on the one hand, their complexity and on-going structural changes 
and, on the other hand, important regulatory implications of their analysis. 
The postal sector, in particular, has traditionally been monopolised and was 
only very recently opened to competition. To date, there is not enough reliable 
empirical data for a traditional economic analysis, as there is limited market 
entry and hardly any competition in the provision of USO products. Postal 
markets are also highly dependent on individual preferences, network effects 
and interactions, making simulations one of the suitable tools for making 
predictions and reasoning ex-ante regulatory decisions. Another reason for 
applying ABM in this context is that intangible benefits are inherently difficult 
to capture with standard analytical tools such as account calculations, for 
example, or equilibrium-based economic models. 
In this paper, the ABM method is applied to analyse the relationship 
between USO and profitability in a postal market open to competition. 
For that purposes, focus is placed on the demand side of the market, which 
eventually determines market shares and profitability of postal operators. The 
agents considered here represent a population of consumers defined by: their 
location (urban or rural area); the operator currently used (Incumbent or 
Entrant); loyalty to the current operator; price elasticity and; accumulated 
4 Behaviour resulting from a series of individual interactions is referred to as ‘emergent’.
5 For example, EMCAS, a large-scale simulation model of the electric power market, was 
designed and used for regulatory purposes by the Illinois Commerce Commission (Cirillo et 
al., 2006).
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past utility with each of the operators, remembered for a certain number of 
individual time periods (e.g. months). The flexibility of ABM makes it possible 
to assume that consumers are boundedly rational and not perfectly informed 
– present decisions are based on past experiences with each of the operators. 
This assumed behaviour seems to reflect reality well. It would be unrealistic 
to assume that postal consumers are perfectly informed of existing postage 
prices or can calculate them as a function of location of their recipients, and 
that they solve an optimisation problem each time they send a piece of mail.
III. Model specification
A stylised model of competition in the postal sector is applied here, with 
an Incumbent initially serving the whole market and an Entrant competing 
for market share. The market is assumed to be geographically divided 
into two broad segments, called for simplicity, ‘urban’ (with lower costs of 
service provision) and ‘rural’ (with higher costs). The cost structure and the 
proportion of each segment in the total market (by number of consumers) are 
known. Both operators are in principle able to deliver throughout the entire 
geographical market. The cost functions are assumed to be identical for both 
operators.
For the purpose of this analysis, only one stylised type of mail is considered 
and service quality is assumed to be identical for both operators. From the 
point of view of consumers, the services provided by the two competing 
operators are thus only different in terms of price. 
The Incumbent is assumed to be the ‘Universal Service Provider’, i.e. 
guaranteeing the provision of postal services of a certain pre-defined quality 
throughout the entire geographical area. Additionally, the obligation is 
assumed to include uniform pricing, i.e. the same price of delivery to the 
rural and to the urban area. By contrast, the Entrant is not bound by uniform 
pricing, a fact which seems to immediately provide him with a competitive 
advantage. 
Nevertheless, this model takes into account the effect on market outcomes 
of consumer ‘loyalty’. It is assumed here that consumers are boundedly rational 
and do not solve the standard optimisation problem each time they use postal 
services. Instead, they remember their past utilities, obtained with each of 
the operators, for a certain time period (e.g. several months) and base their 
current decisions on these accumulated experiences. As shown below, this 
assumption alone can significantly change the results achieved by the two 
postal operators both in terms of market share and profit.
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It needs to be noted that ‘loyalty’ is not understood here as a fixed 
preference for a given brand but as a tendency to consistently use the same 
postal operator, changing over time and resulting from positive experiences 
with its services accumulated in the past. Moreover, to reflect reality better, 
some randomness is introduced in determining customer preferences, i.e. 
a service provider may occasionally be chosen by chance, even if the other 
operator performed better in the past. Additionally, ‘loyalty’ is fully symmetric 
between the Incumbent and the Entrant, i.e. both can profit from the decision-
making inertia of consumers. 
At the beginning of each time period (e.g. each month), consumers send 
mail to each other with a certain predefined probability. Mail can be sent 
to ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ areas, with probabilities depending on the proportion 
of recipients living therein. Consumers choose a postal operator each time 
according to the following rules:
– At the beginning of period 1, all consumers are served by the Incumbent.
– At the end of each subsequent period i, consumers calculate their utility 
from the postal service (if they used it), which is:
U r pi
I I= - ,
 if the consumer is served by the Incumbent, and
U pr r p pr pr1i
Rural ERural RuralE EUrban= - - -+^ ^ ^h h h , 
 if the consumer is served by the Entrant, where:
r   is a constant ensuring the ensuing utilities at least to equal the 
reservation utility of consumers;
pI  is the uniform price charged by the Incumbent;
pERural  and pEUrban are the prices charged by the Entrant in rural and 
urban areas respectively;
pr Rural is the proportion of consumers living in the rural area.
In this model, two types of consumers are considered: those with zero price-
elasticity who send mail every time they need to, irrespective of the price of 
such service and; the ‘price-elastic’ ones who can refrain from sending mail if 
they consider the price to be too high (above some pre-set reservation value). 
In reality, the latter category can be thought of as consumers having access to 
alternative means of delivery such as e-mail, for instance. In this simulation, 
the proportion of ‘price-elastic’ consumers is assumed to be quite high (70%).
The utility obtained from sending mail with either of the operators is 
remembered for a predefined number of periods (e.g. months), weighted 
according to how recent they were:
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Here m is the pre-defined memory span of consumers; andV ViI iE  are the 
accumulated utilities with the Incumbent or the Entrant for the last m periods 
up to period i . While i < m, only i past utilities are included.
At the beginning of each time period, consumers review their accumulated 
utilities and on this basis determine their ’loyalty’ level to the current operator, 
that is, they ‘calculate’ the probability of switching to another operator. This 
probability is modelled here according to the logistic distribution density 
function. The logistic probability distribution was chosen as an approximation, 
widely used in social sciences, for example, to model the learning processes 
as well as many other aspects of human behaviour (e.g. Modis, 1992). After 
calibration, the density function parameters were fixed at μ = 0 and s = 3. 
However, these values are not restrictive in terms of the qualitative outcomes 
below. The probability of switching is:
,L
e1
1
i
s
xi=
+ -  
where xi is the difference between accumulated utilities obtained with the 
Incumbent and the Entrant in the last m periods, i.e.:
x V Vi i
E
i
I= -  , 
if the Incumbent is currently used; 
 V V
I E
i i-  , 
if the Entrant is currently used.
If sending mail, consumers switch in period i + 1 to another operator with 
probability L (1 – L is, therefore, consumers’ loyalty to the current operator). 
The process continues for a certain number of periods (usually, several years), 
fixed in advance.
As for the price setting mechanism of postal operators, some bounded 
rationality is assumed to exist as well. Operators cannot solve the optimization 
problem for prices each and every time (as the demand function is unknown in 
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advance), they maximize profits locally by adjusting their prices in the ‘trial and 
error’ process. In fact, in order to benefit from the inertia in consumer loyalty, 
operators change prices with a certain delay. More precisely, at the beginning 
of the first period, both the Incumbent and the Entrant set their prices slightly 
above marginal costs of delivery. For the Incumbent, the price is uniform and 
is based on the average marginal cost between the rural and the urban area. 
In the subsequent periods, with a certain interval (e.g. every five periods in 
the simulations below), both operators review their prices and change them 
by a certain predefined amount. The direction of the change is determined by 
the previous results in terms of profit (profit is defined in a standard way and 
depends on total demand, prices and costs). If the average profit in the current 
interval is lower than the average profit in the previous interval, the direction 
of the change is reversed. Otherwise, both operators change their prices in 
the same direction as long as the profit is non-decreasing. Additionally, the 
Incumbent’s price is limited from above by the pre-set regulatory ceiling.
It is assumed here that the cost structure is as follows: service costs in the 
urban and the rural area are both fixed; they are higher in the rural area. 
Variable (per item) costs are higher for the rural area as well. These costs, 
as well as the initial values for delivery prices, were chosen arbitrarily on the 
assumption that only their relative values matter for the below outcomes. 
Specifically, the following parameters were used in all the following 
simulations:
Parameter Value
Population size 1000
Number of periods 100
Probability of sending mail in each period (equal for all consumers) 0.8
Proportion of ‘price-elastic’ consumers 0.7
Constant r in the utility function of consumers 6
Fixed costs in the rural area 200
Fixed costs in the urban area 100
Variable per-item cost of delivery to the rural area 3
Variable per-item cost of delivery to the urban area 1
Incumbent’s uniform price start value 3
Entrant’s price in the rural area start value 4
Entrant’s price in the urban area start value 2
Reservation price for price-elastic consumers 5
Initial loyalty to the Incumbent 0.5
Step for price changes 0.2
Number of periods with unchanged price 5
Figure 1. Parameters used in the simulations.
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It is clear that with the above starting prices, the Incumbent provides higher 
utility to consumers sending mail to the rural area. On the other hand, using 
the Entrant is beneficial when sending to the urban segment. Intuitively, given 
the assumptions of this model, this should form a positive perception of the 
Incumbent when consumers often send mail to the rural area. It follows that 
in terms of market share, the Incumbent benefits from the larger size of the 
rural area. This relationship is investigated in more detail below.
IV. Main results
The results of the following simulation demonstrate these effects for the 
population of 1000 consumers, spanning 100 time periods (e.g. 100 months, 
meaning approximately eight years). At first, it is assumed that the rural 
segment occupies half of the geographical area to be served. To see the effect 
of consumer loyalty on market outcomes, it is first assumed that consumers 
are not able to remember their past experiences, that is, they are indifferent 
to the two operators at the beginning of each period. The simulation with a 
zero memory span results in the following distribution of market shares and 
profits: 
Figure 2. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural and urban areas 
are equal, and consumers’ memory span is 0.
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It can be immediately observed that the evolution of market shares in this 
case is totally random. This is explained by the fact that consumers make 
no reference to their past experiences when choosing which operator to use. 
Moreover, as at the beginning all consumers are served by the Incumbent and 
have little incentive to switch, the Incumbent tends to keep a higher market 
share and, with the assumed cost-price structure, tends to enjoy superior 
profits.
When consumer loyalty is introduced into the model but keeping the 
same geographical division, the situation does not change significantly. What 
happens, however, if it is assumed that consumers are able to memorise their 
experience for 10 subsequent periods? The simulation, with other parameters 
unchanged, now yields the following results:
Figure 3. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural and urban areas 
are equal, and consumers’ memory span is 10 periods. 
Although market shares evolve more systematically in this model, the two 
operators tend to perform at the same level. Indeed, given that the Incumbent 
gives better service experiences in the rural area and the Entrant in the urban 
segment and that the two areas are of equal size, both operators provide on 
average the same experiences to their consumers, who are therefore equally 
loyal to both operators. 
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As discussed above, the scale of the importance of consumer loyalty changes, 
intuitively, depending on the respective size of the rural area. That relationship 
is investigated in more detail below. When the size of the rural area is relatively 
large, the Incumbent enjoys an obvious competitive advantage. For example, 
let’s assume that the share of the rural area is 80% and the memory span of 
consumers is, as before, 10 time periods (e.g. months):
Figure 4. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural area occupies 80%, 
and consumers’ memory span is 10 periods. 
The outcome is now very different. The Incumbent gains a steadily superior 
market share and also enjoys, after a certain point (around 20 months), a sig-
nificant advantage in terms of profits. Moreover, running several simulations 
with different parameters, it can be concluded that the Incumbent starts to 
enjoy some competitive advantage when consumers can only recall one period 
back, the exact effect depending on the simulation parameters including the 
importance associated by consumers with the last memorised utility. 
Importantly, the above result is only due to the change in the size of the 
rural area. To stress this result, let’s assume now that the proportion of the 
rural area is very small (20%). The situation reverses: the Incumbent clearly 
loses market share to the Entrant and faces a significant disadvantage in terms 
of profits:
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Figure 5. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural area occupies 20%, 
and consumers’ memory span is 10 periods. 
The profits of the Incumbent eventually fall lower than those of the Entrant, 
although the urban segment (where the Incumbent’s uniform price is higher 
than the Entrant’s urban price), accounts for 80% of the market. As before, 
this is due to the loss in the Incumbent’s market share, which occurs because 
the Entrant persistently performs better in the urban sector, which is very 
large in this simulation. 
Although it is generally believed that the larger the loss-making segment, 
the greater the competitive disadvantage imposed by uniform pricing, the 
backward-looking nature of consumer demand may inverse this relationship 
in this model. The Incumbent enjoys a competitive advantage due to consumer 
loyalty unless the size of the rural area is too small, in which case the uniform 
price is a disadvantage. 
It needs to be noted that the above simulations assumed that uniform prices 
allow the Incumbent to cover its marginal costs in both geographical areas. 
Restricting regulatory conditions further, what would happen, however, if 
the Incumbent is forced by the uniform price ceiling to serve both areas at 
its average marginal cost (i.e. at a loss, taking into account the fixed costs 
incurred)? Running the simulation with the rural area accounting for 80% of 
the market, the following results can be observed:
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Figure 6. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural area is 80% of the 
total, consumers’ memory span is 10 periods, and rural area is loss-making.
As before, the Incumbent’s market share is steadily increasing and even-
tually covers almost the entire market. However, the Incumbent is clearly 
suffering a loss in each period, due to serving a significant part of the mar-
ket at a below-marginal-costs price. In this case, although advantageous for 
consumers who clearly prefer to be served by the Incumbent throughout the 
entire geographical area, uniform pricing hurts the Incumbent and needs to 
be compensated accordingly. Moreover, the Entrant who cannot compete on 
these restrictive terms eventually loses market share to the Incumbent and is 
forced out of the market. The total welfare effect of the uniform pricing in 
this case is, therefore, ambiguous, but most probably negative. 
However, it is possible to find a size of the rural area that allows the 
Incumbent to do both: gain market share and enjoy positive economic results 
even under restrictive pricing conditions. For example, let’s assume that the 
size of the rural segment is 55% (Figure 7).
The rural segment is now big enough to allow the Incumbent to gain a sig-
nificant market share without the rural area being too big, however, to hinder 
its profitability. At some point, the Incumbent’s profits become equal to, or 
even slightly higher, than those of the Entrant. In other words, a rural area of 
a particular size allows the Incumbent to have a competitive advantage due to 
consumer loyalty. However, as shown before, if the size of the rural segment 
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Figure 7. Market shares and profits of postal operators when rural area is 55% of the 
total, consumers’ memory span is 10 periods, and rural area is loss-making.
increases, this advantage is compensated by the operational loss in the rural 
segment.
It is worth plotting this relationship for the parameters above and for the 
size of the rural area increasing from 0 to 100%. Figures 8 and 9 below show 
the Incumbent’s advantage in terms of average market share and total profits 
over 100 time periods depending on the size of the rural area.
Figure 8. Incumbent’s advantage over Entrant in terms of market share as a function 
of the rural area size.
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Figure 9. Incumbent’s advantage over Entrant in terms of total profit as a function 
of the rural area size.
In other words, even under restrictive pricing conditions, the loss-making 
segment does not constitute for the Incumbent a competitive disadvantage 
a priori and, for that reason, does not call for compensatory regulatory 
intervention merely because of its existence. Empirically, the exact size of 
these effects and the breakpoint size of the rural area certainly need to be 
estimated on a case-by-case basis. While the results above were obtained with 
arbitrary parameters and cannot be readily used for regulatory decisions, they 
have shown that the relationship between consumer loyalty and the size of the 
area with high service costs is crucial for the welfare analysis of USO. 
V. Conclusions 
The above simulation results show that consumer loyalty is a crucial 
factor for the profitability of postal operators. Moreover, consumer loyalty 
can provide an incumbent with a competitive advantage, even when forced – 
through uniform pricing constraint – to operate unprofitably in some areas. 
These results are counter-intuitive, as it is generally believed that the larger 
the loss-making segment, the bigger the competitive disadvantage imposed 
by uniform pricing is. The backward-looking nature of consumer demand, 
assumed in the above model, inverses this relationship. Due to consumer 
loyalty, an incumbent enjoys a competitive advantage unless the size of the 
loss-making area is not big enough to form a positive perception, or indeed, 
if it is too big to allow for overall profitability.
When discussing policy implications, however, it is important to be prudent. 
There are limits to the predictive and prescriptive abilities of ABM (discussed 
e.g. in Twomey and Cadman, 2002). While the ABM method undoubtedly 
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provides useful qualitative insights, the exact impact of specific policy changes 
cannot be conclusively predicted without further refinements to the model. 
First of all, identifying the rules governing individual behaviour is in itself 
a complex task, often involving arbitrary assumptions. To some extent, this 
problem can be solved by testing different calibrations of the above model, 
which this paper has partially done. Second, in order to closely reflect reality, 
ABM simulations should be based on adequate empirical data in terms of 
defining individual rules as well as specifying relevant parameters. 
What recommendations can be made, therefore, for further research? First, 
at least partial empirical estimation of the parameters used in the above model 
could improve its robustness and predictive ability. Second, further calibration 
refinements could be made. The model is flexible enough to allow for different 
kinds of extensions (e.g. ‘business’ and ‘retail’ customers, or different kinds of 
services). Moreover, interactions between consumers, such as synchronisation 
of decision-making or knowledge sharing, could be introduced. Finally, the issue 
of which mechanism is preferable for compensating the net cost of USO was 
left beyond the scope of this analysis. One could extend it to, for example, the 
implications of different ways of compensation or to a bargaining process over 
the net cost between a USO provider and the respective regulatory authorities.
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